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1. S ee Far agher  v. City of Boca Raton, 111 F.3d  1530, 1533 (11 th  Cir . 19 97),
cert . gra nt ed , 11 8 S . Ct . 43 8 (19 97).
2. Id .
3. Id .
4. S ee id .
5. S ee id .
6. S ee infra  no t e 28 and  accompanying t ext .
7. S ee Far agh er, 111 F.3d at  1534. To win on  a sexu al h ar ass men t claim  a
pla in ti ff mu st  de mo ns tr at e t ha t “(1) s he  bel on gs t o a p ro te cte d gr ou p, (2 ) she was
su bject  to unwelcome sexual harassment, (3) the har assment was b ased  on sex, (4)
the ha ras smen t  affected a ‘ter m,  con dit ion , or  pr ivil ege ’ of emp loym en t,  an d (5) t he
employer knew or should have known of the hara ssment in  question and fail ed  to
take remedia l  act ion .” Ha ll v.  Gu s C on st r.  Co.,  842  F. 2d  101 0, 1 013  (8t h C ir . 19 88).
The fifth elemen t will change depend i n g on th e sta nda rd for find ing em ployer lia bility
in  th e pa rt icular  circuit . S ee, e.g., Kau ffman v. Allied Sig n a l, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 183
(6th  Cir . 19 92) (c h a ng ing  th e fift h e lem en t t o “th e ex ist en ce of re spon dea t s up er ior
liability” the n  going on to exp lain w ha t t ha t m ean s in a  sup ervisor -creat ed host ile
envi ronmen t s exual  h a rass men t claim ). For th e emp loyer liabilit y sta nda rd in  th e
E leven th  Circuit, see infra  note 51 .
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Youn g v. Bayer Corp.: When  is Notice of Sexua l
Harassment  to an  Employee  Not ice  to the
Employer?
I. IN T R O D U C T I O N
 Beth  Ann Faragh er  and N ancy E wa nchew were both  work-
ing as l ifeguards  for  th e City of Boca Ra ton , Florid a in  th e
Parks  and  Recrea t ion  Depar tment ’s Marin e Sa fety Sect ion
when  they were su bjected t o sexua l ha ra ssm ent  by th eir  supe r -
visors.1 Fa ra gher  tes tified t ha t a  su per visor t ouched  her  sh oul-
der s an d waist  nu mer ous t ime s, “pat te d h er  th igh” an d
“slapp ed her  on t he  re ar  end .”2 Ewan chew alleged  “tw o specific
incidents  whe re [t he s am e su per visor] tou ched h er in  a s exua lly
offen sive manner .”3 Both  women  inform ed one of th eir
supervisors, Mar ine Sa fety Lieuten an t a nd Tr a inin g Cap ta in
Robe r t  Gor don , of the ha ras smen t .4 Gordon  told  no one , desp it e
the fact  tha t  othe r  female  li feguards  had compla ined  about
harass ing behavior  t oo.5 Fa ragher  sued the  ci ty for  sexua l
harassment  under Title VII6 and  won .7 On appea l  the  E leven th
Circuit reversed, s t a t ing , in ter  a lia , t ha t  Gor don ’s k nowle dge of
the sexua l  ha ra s smen t  could not  be  im pu ted  to Boca  Ra ton
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8. Faragher, 111 F.3d at 1538. Even if Gordon had been consid ered “higher
ma na geme nt ,” the  E levent h Cir cuit m ight  not h ave im put ed his  kn owledge to t he city
because the court felt  t h a t “Gordon did  not r eceive th at  inform at ion as  th e City’s
agen t ; he received it as a friend h eld in high repu te by his colleagues .” Id .  at 1538
n.9.
9. S ee id . at 1538-39.
10. Van  Zant  v. KLM Royal Du tch Air lines , 80  F. 3d  708 , 71 0-11  (2d C ir . 19 96).
11. S ee id . at 711, 715.
12. S ee id . at 711.
13. S ee id .
14. S ee id . at 710, 715.
15. S ee id . at 715-16.
16. S ee Ni cho ls v . F ra nk , 42  F. 3d  503 , 50 6-07  (9t h C ir . 19 94).
17. S ee id. at 507 . Fr an cisco r epe at edl y cond iti one d em ploym en t b en efit s on
Nichols’ willingness t o perform ora l sex. This prolonged sexual ha rassm ent caus ed
Nichols  to suffer depression, anxiety, irritablity, sleeping and eating difficulties,
we igh t loss, a suicide attempt, a nd finally divorce. See id .
18. S ee id. Fra ncisco is still employed by the P ostal Service, at the sa me office,
because th e Me ri t S yst em  Pr ote ction  Boa rd  re ver sed  th e de cision  to t e r m in a t e h i m .
because  Gordon  “did n ot r an k a s h igher -ma na geme nt  in t he
Cit y.”8 Th er efor e, t he cit y h ad n o du ty t o act  on  Gor don ’s
knowle dge a nd w as n ot  lia ble  for  it s fa ilu re t o do s o.9
Consider  too the  case of Kare n  Va n  Zan t .  Hasan  King , Van
Zan t ’s co-work er, regr essed over  a  pe r iod  of months fr om
flirt ing with  Van  Zan t  t o “making lewd sexual remarks t o
he r .”10 Van  Zan t ’s  supervi sor ,  Emily Browne,  apparen t ly knew
of the situat ion (as did a superv isor  from another  depar tment )11
but took  no act ion  un t i l Van  Zan t r eported t ha t King exposed
him self t o he r .12 Brow n e t hen  rep or ted  the in ciden t  to the
employer’s per sonn el di r ect or .13 Van  Zan t  sued  for  sexua l
har assm e n t un der Tit le VII, alleging her  employer should be
liable  for not responding sooner to Browne an d th e other
depar t m ent  super visor’s kn owledge of the h ar ass men t. 14 The
Second Circu i t  r ejected  tha t  a rgumen t ,  ru ling tha t  Browne and
the oth er  su per visor w er e t oo “low-level” to im pu te  kn owledge
to the  employer .15
Fin ally,  cons ider  the ca se  of Ter ri Nichols. Deaf and m ut e,
Nichols could  only com munica te vi a  sign  la ngu age w it h  Ron
Fran cisco,  the h igh es t  ranki ng su pe rvis or  on h er  sh ift .16
Fra ncisco subjected  Nich ols to six m ont hs  of extr em e sexu al
harassment  res u lt in g in  myr ia d p er son a l proble ms for
Nichols.17 Nichols finally report ed Fr an cisco’s ha ra ssm ent  a nd
instigated a sexual harassm ent suit un der Title VII against  her
employer, th e Unit ed S t ates P ostal Ser vice.18 Corr ectin g th e
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S ee id . at 507 n .1.
19. Id . at 508.
20. S ee id . However , th e Post  Office was  held lia ble for  qu id  pro  quo  sexua l
ha ras smen t . See infra note  33-42 an d accompa nyin g te x t  for a  discuss ion of hostile
envi ronmen t and  qu id p ro quo sexua l  ha ra ssmen t .
21. S ee infra  Pa rt  II for a d eta iled look a t  the  cur ren t  s ta te  of  Ti t le  VII  sexua l
ha ras smen t  law.
22. In  this context “employee” includes everyone employed by the employer
regardless of position in  th e corpor at e hie ra rch y. 
23. S ee infra  not e 51  an d a ccomp an yin g te xt.  Alth ough  oth er  gr oun ds e xist  for
finding  employer liability, what  the em ployer knew is key for several  reasons . F i r st ,
it  is th e only bas is common  to ever y circuit (it  is the on ly ba sis  for  ha lf t he  cir cui ts ).
Second, even in  th ose circuit s with  mu ltiple gr ound s for imposin g  em ployer liabilit y,
t he emp loye r’s k now led ge w ill ge ne ra lly b e t he  onl y ba sis  up on w hi ch t he  pla in ti ff can
rea listically  hope t o win. The  othe r gr ound s for imposin g liabi li t y a r e a lmos t  neve r ,
or  a t  least  rela tively less , applicab le. For e xam ple, five circuits  (the T hir d, Sixth ,
Ten th , Eleve nt h, a nd D.C.) purport t o impose employer liability if the ha ras ser wa s
ac ting with in the scope of his em ploymen t. H owever, four  of those circu its
acknowledge  th at  sexua l ha ra ssm ent  would r ar ely, if ever, be consid ered  with in t he
scope of one’s employm ent . S ee Har rison v. Eddie P otash , Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1446
(10th Cir .  1997) ; Faragher  v. City of Boca Ra ton, 111  F.3d 153 0, 1536-37 (11th  Cir.
199 7),  cert . gra nt ed , 118 S. Ct . 438 (1997); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C.
Cir . 1995) (implicitly discount ing scope of employment  as a ba sis  fo r e m ployer
lia bil it y); Bouton v. B.M.W. of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106-07 (3 d Ci r.  199 4). An d
the Sixth  Circuit  would excus e th e emp loyer from lia bility if it r espond ed ad equa tely
to not ice of the h ar ass men t. S ee Pierce v. Commonwea lth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796,
803 (6th Cir .  1994). The other  grounds for imposing employer liability (besides
employer kn owledge) a re lik ewise lim ited  in t heir  app licabilit y. S ee infra  not e 51  for
the o ther  employer  l iab il ity  s tanda r ds and the respective cited cases for how those
standa rds  ar e limit ed in t heir  applica bility.
24. See Glen  Allen  St as zews ki,  Not e, U s in g Agency Principles for Guidan ce in
F ind ing Em ploy er L iab ilit y for  a S up ervi sor’s Hos tile Work Environment Sexual
Harassmen t , 48 VA N D. L. RE V. 105 7 (19 95).
Any  victim of sexu al hara ssmen t  s eek ing  r ed ress  fo r  t he wrong
commi t t ed against her mu st  es tabl ish  tha t sexua l ha ra ssm ent  occurre d. This
s h owing,  how eve r, m ay n ot r esol ve t he  iss ue  in t he  vict im ’s fa vor . For  t he
victim  to r eceiv e fu ll r ecover y, t he  cour t  m us t h old t he  em ploye r li ab le for
dist rict  cour t ,  the Nin th  Circu it  s t a t ed  the p roper  t e st  for
dete rmin ing employer liability was “what  ma na gement  level
employees kn ew or s hou ld h ave  kn own.”19 Under  th i s t e st  the
Posta l Service was not liable.20
As illust ra ted  by t he for egoing examp les, und er cur ren t
law,21 t he  de termina t ion  of wh ich employee’s22 not i ce  of sexua l
harassment  can  be deem ed n otice to t he e mp loyer  is often  th e
key to det erm inin g emp loyer lia bilit y for Tit le VII host ile
environm ent  sexual harassm ent claims.23 A find ing of employer
liabilit y is imp ort an t be cau se it  pla ys a  cent ra l role in  pr oviding
relief to t he vict im 24  and achiev in g t he equ a lit y-by-de ter ren ce
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t he sexua l ha ra ssm ent . If the  court  refus es to m ake  th is find ing , t he
victim ’s relief ma y be su bsta nt ially dim inish ed or even  eviscera ted b y th e
fact  t hat individual su pervisors are n ot as well-situated as a re th eir
employe r s to provide the ma ke-whole relief contemplat ed by Title VII.
Id . at  105 9 (cit at ion s om it te d).
25. S ee Ja nse n v. P acka ging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1997)
(as ser t ing th at  th e p ri ma ry  pu rp ose  of Title VII is t o promot e equa lity in t he
wor kp la ce by encouraging employers to deter  hara ssing be ha vior), cert. granted in
part  Burlingt on Indu s., Inc. v. Ellerth, No. 97-569, 1998 WL 21891 (U.S. Jan . 23,
199 8).
26. S ee, e.g., David  Benja min  Oppen heim er, Exacerbating the Exasp erating: Title
VII Liability of Em ployers For Sexu al Harassm ent Comm itted by  Their S upervisors,
81 CORNELL  L. RE V. 66, 97-98 (1995) (devoting only one  page in  a n  84 page  ar ticle
to dis cus sio n o f an  em ploy er ’s ne glig en ce li ab ilit y ba se d on  wh at  wa s k no wn ).
27. 123 F. 3d  672  (7t h C ir . 19 97).
pur poses25 of Tit le VI I.  Th us,  de cidin g the circum sta nces un der
which  an  emp loyee’s n otice can  be t rea ted  as  emp loyer n otice is
im men se ly impor tan t .
Desp ite  th e im portance of this issue it  has not received the
scholar ly at ten tion it des erves . Com men ta tors t yp ica lly  focus,
instead, on the overall stat e of sexua l ha rassment  l aw
(critiqu ing cur ren t , a nd p ropos in g n ew, gr ounds for imp osing
employer liability). Though useful, th ese comm en ta rie s h ave
failed to ade qu a tely  add res s t he n ar rower  bu t  im por tan t
que st ion of wh ich  em ployee’s kn owledge of sexual ha ra ssm ent
ma y be imput ed to th e employer.26
This  Note  examines the  approaches cour t s  have  t aken  in
deter minin g which employees’ knowledge of sexua l har ass men t
can  be  im pu ted  to the employer.  In pa r t icu lar , t h is  Note
an alyzes the  approach  t aken  in  Young v. Ba yer Corp.,27 a  r ecen t
Seven th Circu i t de cis ion . P ar t  II  discu ss es  the cu r ren t  st a te of
the law for em ployer lia bility u nd er T itle VII, m ore fully
re vealin g why th e quest ion of impu ting k nowledge to t he
employer is a n im port an t, if not  th e most  cru cial, inqu iry in
every ci r cu i t.  Pa r t  III  presents th e facts of Young and  reviews
the rea soning behin d th e Young decision .  Par t  IV compares the
novel  approach  t aken  in  Young  with  the two a lt e rna tive
appr oaches cur ren t ly u se d in  other  cir cu it s.  Th is  se ct ion  a l so
ana lyzes whet her  th e Young rule more effectively achieves the
pur poses of Title  VI I  than  do the  other  more  widespread
approaches. It a lso discuss es potent ial app licat ion problems the
Young rule may have compar ed to the alternative approaches.
Pa r t  V concludes th at  because t he Young ru le bes t  ach ieves  the
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28. S ee 42 U .S. C. § 2 000 e-2 (1 994 ).
Un lawful employment pr actices
(a)  Employer pra ctices
 It sha ll be an unla wful employment pra ctice for an em ployer—
(1) to fail or refuse t o hire or to discharge any  individ ual, or otherwise
to discriminate a gainst a ny individual with r espect to his compens a tion,
terms,  cond iti ons , or p rivi lege s of em ploy me nt , be cau se  of su ch
individu al’s ra ce, color, religion , sex, or n at iona l origin ; . . .
Id .
29. S ee Oppen heim er, supra  not e 26, a t 110 . 
30. Id . at  112. 
31. Mer itor  Sa v. B an k,  FS B v.  Vin son , 47 7 U .S.  57,  73 (1 986 ).
32. While  th is N ote’s focus is on hostile environment hara ssment, as the
qu est ion  of employer notice is irrelevant  to finding employer liability for quid pro quo
pur poses of Title VII, although  it ad mit tedly will be mor e
di fficu lt  t o apply, it should be t he a ppr oach used in  every
circuit .
II. BA CK G R OU N D
 Alth ough  Tit le VII of th e Civil Righ ts Act of 1964 p roh ibi t s
employer se x-ba se d d iscr im in a t ion ,28 mos t  cour t s init ially found
tha t  se xu a l h arass men t  fel l ou t side  the s cope  of Tit le  VII
p rotection .29 By 1980, t hou gh, s ever al cir cuit  court s bega n
ru l in g th at  “emp loymen t d ecisions condit ioned on  su per visoria l
sexua l dem ands  [i.e. quid pro quo sexua l har ass men t]
cons t it u t ed se xu a l h arass men t  in  viola t ion  of Tit le VII.”30
Fin ally,  in 1986, the Sup r em e Cour t  ru led tha t  “hos t il e
environmen t” sexual hara ssment  also violates Title VII.31
The fol lowing  two subpar t s  add  deta i l t o the synopsis just
given of t he  cu r ren t s t a t e of Tit le VII se xua l ha ra ssm ent  law by
discu ssin g: (a) the t wo types of actionable sexua l  ha ra s smen t ,
and (b) the s ta nd ar ds of emp loyer liab ility u nd er b oth . This
background in format ion  i s necessa ry  to unders tand  the
que st ion of impu tin g kn owledge t o th e em ployer a nd  its
impor tance , and will help fram e and focus the discuss ion  of
Youn g v. Bayer Corp .
A. Th e Types of Actionable Sexual H arassm ent Und er Title
VII
 As indicated a bove, cour t s  have  come to recognize two types
of act iona ble se xua l  h ara ssm ent  claims  un der  Title VII : quid
pro quo32 an d hostile envir onmen t.
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haras smen t , a br ief overview of quid pr o quo is includ ed to pr ovid e  a  co m pl et e pict ur e
of the sexual ha rassm ent field.
33. S ee Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395-96 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[T]he grava men
of a  qu id  pro q uo claim is t ha t a  ta ngible  job ben efit  or p ri vileg e is  cond iti one d on
an  employee ’s su bm iss ion t o sex ua l bla ck-m ail  an d t ha t a dve rs e con seq ue nce s follow
from  th e em ploye e’s re fus al. ”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997), which states:
(a)  Har assm ent on t he bas is of sex is a violation of section 703 of t itle VII.
U n w el co m e se xu al  ad va nce s, r equ es ts  for  s e xu a l fav ors , an d ot he r v er ba l or
physica l conduct  o f a  sexua l  na ture  const i tu te  sexua l harassment wh en (1)
su bm iss ion  to such conduct is made e ither ex plicit ly or  im plicit ly a  te rm  or
condit ion  of an  in div idu al ’s e mp loym en t,  (2) su bm iss ion  to or  re ject ion o f
such  conduct by an individual is used as t he basis for employment  decis ions
a ffec t ing such  individ ua l . . . . 
Id . (foot no te  om it te d).
34. S ee Ni cho ls v . F ra nk , 42  F. 3d  503 , 50 8-09  (9t h C ir . 19 94).
35. S ee infra  Par t II.B.1.
36. Long, 59 F.3d at  1396.
37. Ha rr is v. F or kl ift  Sys ., I nc. , 51 0 U .S.  17,  22 (1 993 ).
1. Quid  pro quo
 Quid pr o quo sexu al ha ra ssm ent  is wher e an  employer, or
one of the employer ’s s upe rvis ors,  condi t ion s a  ta ngible job
ben efit  on  an  employee’s r esponse to sexual advances.33 An
exam ple of this  kind of sexua l ha rassment  may  occur  when  a
supervisor  au th orized to gran t t ime off r equ ir es  se xu a l fa vor s
before g ran t ing  the requ est t o an em ployee.34 The  key t o quid
p ro qu o se xu a l h arass men t  cla im s,  and t he p urpor ted  rea son
w h y t he st an da rd  of employer lia bility is  differen t t ha n wit h
hos t il e environment  claims,35 is that t he “supervisor mu st  have
wielded the au thority entrust ed to him to subject  t he  vi ct im  to
adverse job consequ ences as a  res u l t of her  refu sa l to su bmit  to
un welcome s exu al a dva nces .”36
2. Hos ti le env i ronment
 Hos t il e envir on m e n t  se xu a l h a r a s sm e nt is, perha ps, less
su scept ible t o a  pra ctical (“ma th ema tically precise”37) de fin it ion
than  quid pr o quo hara ssm ent . Noneth eless, th e Supr eme
Cour t , borr owing h eavily from  th e Eq ua l Em ployment
O p por t u n i ty  Comm iss ion ’s  (EE OC) Guid e l in e s  on
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38. S ee 29 C .F .R § 1 604 .11 (a) (1 997 ):
(a)  Har assmen t on th e basis of sex is a violation of sect i on  703 of title
VII. Unwelcome sexua l advan ces, requests  for sexual favors, and other
verba l or p hy sica l con d u ct  of a sexual n atu re constitut e sexual ha rassm ent
when  . . . (3) su ch con du ct h as  th e pu rp ose or  effect  of un re as ona bly
in t er f er ing wit h a n i nd ivid ua l’s wor k p er forma nce or  crea t ing an
int imida tin g, hostile, or offensive working environm ent.
Id . (footnote omitted). Just ifying its reliance on the E EOC guidelines the Su preme
Cou rt  no ted ,  “As an  ‘admin is t ra tive int erpr eta tion of [Title VII] by th e enforcin g
agen cy,’ th ese gu idelines , ‘while n ot contr olling upon  th e court s by re ason  of their
au th ority,  do constitu te a body of experience a n d  in form ed ju dgm en t t o wh ich cou rt s
and litiga nt s ma y prope rly r esort  for guid an ce.’” Mer ito r S a v. Ba nk , FS B v. Vin son ,
477 U.S . 57, 6 5 (198 6) (qu ot i n g G r iggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34
(1971)  an d S ki dm or e v.  Sw ift  & Co. , 32 3 U .S.  134 , 14 0 (19 44)).
39. Mer itor  Sav .  Bank, 477 U . S.  a t  65 (citat ions omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 160 4.1 1(a ) (199 7)).
40. Harris , 510 U.S. a t 23 (not ing t ha t r elevan t circu mst an ces ma y include:
“[T]he  frequ ency of the  discrim ina tory cond uct; its  sever ity; whe th er it  is phys ically
th rea t en ing or hum iliating, or a mere offensive utter a nce; an d whe th er it
un rea sona bly in te rfe re s w it h a n e mp loye e’s wor k p er for ma nce .”).
41. S ee K a u ffman  v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 180-81 (6th Cir . 1992)
(de ta il ing th e su per visor a nd co-work er’s comme nt s an d act ions). 
42. S ee Da vis  v. C it y of Si ou x Ci ty , 11 5 F .3d  136 5, 1 365 -66 (8 th  Cir . 19 97).
Discrim in a t ion  Becau se of Sex, 38 cha ra cter izes h ostile
envi ronment  sexua l  ha rassment  as
“[u]n we lcom e s e x u a l  a d va n c e s , re qu es ts  for s exu al  fav ors , an d
ot h e r ver ba l or p h ysica l con d u c t  of a s exu al  n at u re [,]” . . .
w h e t h e r  or n ot  it  is d ir ect ly li n ke d t o t h e g r a n t o r  de n ia l of a n
econ om ic q u id  p ro q u o,  w h e r e “s u ch  co n du c t h a s  t h e  pu r p os e
or  effect  of un re as on ab ly in te rfe rin g w ith  an  in div idu al ’s w ork
p e rfor m a n ce  or  creat ing a n in t im idat ing,  host i le ,  or  offens ive
wor kin g en vir on m en t.”39
Whether a h ostile en vironmen t exis ts  depe nd s on t he “tota lity
of a l l the  ci rcumstances” sur roundin g th e a lleged s exu al
ha ras smen t .40
 An  example would be wh ere a  super visor and  co-work ers
rep eat edly a sk  to see  the r e su l ts of the victim’s breast
en la rgement su rge ry.41 In  an oth er  case , a  cour t  found  tha t  a
hos t il e environment  was created wh e n  a  superv isor  sp read
rumors tha t  t he v ict im  i s a n  adu lt er es s,  followed  her  to the
re st room to ensure she talks t o no men , called anoth er
depar tment  hea d t o se e if s he is  t a lk in g t o men  from tha t
depa r tme n t , and com men ted  on t he in app ropr ia ten es s of t he
victim ’s at tire. 42
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43. S ee Har rison v. Eddy P otash , Inc., 112 F.3d 1437, 1443 (10th Cir . 199 7); see
also Meri tor  Sav . Bank, 477 U.S. at 76 (Mar sha ll, J ., concu rr ing ) (“[E]ver y Cou rt  of
Appeals  tha t  has  considered  the  i s sue  has h e ld  t hat  sex ua l ha ra ssm en t b y su per visor y
personnel  is automa tically imputed to the em ployer when the h ara ssmen t r esu lts in
ta ngible  job detr imen t t o the  subor dina te  emp loyee.”); Sta szews ki, supra  no te 24 , a t
1059-60 (“[C]ourts  un ifo rm ly hold em ployers s tr ictly liable for qu id pro qu o sexua l
ha ra ssm ent .”).
44. S ee Harri son , 112  F. 3d a t 1 443  (re as oni ng  th at  th e im pos it ion  of st ri ct
l iab il it y “r e s t s upon  the  fac t t ha t  t he  supe rvi so r  was  act ing wit hin  th e scope of his
ac tua l or ap par ent  au th ority” or becau se he  was a ided by t he a gency re lat ionsh ip
with  his em ployer in  accomplish ing t he h ar ass men t (quot ing Ka ribia n v. Colum bia
Un iv., 14 F .3d  773 , 77 7 (2d  Cir . 19 94))).
45. S ee RE S T AT E M E N T (SE C O N D) O F  AGE NC Y § 219 (1958) [h ere ina ft e r  AGENCY
§ 219 ].
Sect ion  219. When  Mast er is L iable for Tor ts of His S erva nt s
(1) A master  is subject to liability for th e torts of his servant s committed
while  acting in th e scope of their employment .
(2) A master  is not subject to liability for the tor ts  of h i s s e rvan t s  act ing
outside the scope of their employment, unless:
(a)  th e m as te r in te nd ed t he  cond uct  or t he  cons equ en ces,  or
(b) th e m as te r w as  ne glige nt  or r eck les s, or
(c) th e con du ct vi olat ed a  non -dele gab le d ut y of th e m as te r, or
(d) t he servant  purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal
and th ere w as r elian ce upon a ppar ent  au th ority, or h e was  aided  in
B. Em ployer Liability for Quid Pro Quo and Hostile
Envi ron m ent S exu al  Har as sm ent
 Consisten t  wit h dist inguishing between  th ese two types  of
sexua l ha ra s smen t , federal court s ha ve developed different
stan dards  for det erm ining when  th ere is em ployer liabilit y for
quid  pro quo hara ssme n t  versu s when  th ere is em ployer
liabilit y for  h ost i le  env ironment  ha rassment . While the
employer lia bil it y s t anda rd for  quid  pr o quo ha ra ssm ent  is well-
se t t led , t he s t anda rd for  host ile  en vir onmen t  case s i s n ot .
1. Em pl oyer  liab il it y for qu id  pr o qu o har as sm ent
 In  cases of quid pro quo harassm en t  cou r t s  r out inely  hold
the emp loyer st rict ly liable for t he sexu al ha ra ssm ent
commi t ted by t he employer ’s s upe rvis or .43 Cou r t s a pp ly s t r ict
liabilit y because t he qu id pro quo ha ra sser  necessar ily exercises
the au th ority gran ted h im by th e employer to effectu at e the
sexua l ha ra s smen t .44 Hen ce, liability can be imputed  to the
employer un der  th e “appa ren t a ut hor ity” ra tion a l e of th e
Rest a tem en t  (Se cond) Agen cy se ct ion  219 (1) a nd (2 )(d). 45
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accompl ish ing th e t ort  by t he  exis te nce  of th e a gen cy re lat ion.
Id .
46. S ee Sta szews ki, supra  note 24, at  1061.
47. S ee AGENCY  § 219, supra  note 45.
48. S ee 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1997) (“(d) With respect to conduct between
fellow  employees, an employer is responsible for acts  of sexual h ar ass men t in  th e
wor kp la ce wh er e t he  em ploye r (or  its  age nt s or  sup ervis ory  em ploye es) k now s or
shou ld ha ve k now n of t he  cond uct , u nl es s it  can  show tha t  i t  took  immedia t e  and
appropr ia t e cor re cti ve a cti on .”).
49. Mer itor  Sa v. B an k,  FS B v.  Vin son , 47 7 U .S.  57,  72 (1 986 ).
50. Id . In  dir ect in g low er  cou rt s t o se ek  gu ida nce  from t he  la w of a g en c y t he
cour t  ma de s pecia l re fer en ce t o RE S T AT E M E N T (SE C O N D) O F  AGE NC Y §§ 219-237. I d .
Sect ion  219 is of pa rt icular  impor ta nce, see supra  note 45.
51. Foll owin g i s t he  employer  liabilit y sta nda rd for Tit le VII sup ervisor  host ile
2. Em ployer liability for hostile environm ent sexual
harassment
 When  it comes to deter minin g employer liabi lit y for  hos t il e
environm ent  sexual harassm ent court s typically distinguish
between  co-worker  and superv isor -crea ted  harassment  and
ma ny a pply a  differen t s ta nd ar d a ccord ingly.
a . Co-w ork er-cr eat ed  host i le  environm ent  sexual
harassment. Cour t s hold th e employer liable for co-worker -
crea t ed hostile environm ent  sexua l har ass men t if the em ployer
knew or should have known of the harassm ent an d failed to
take  appropr ia te  act ion .46 Th is  s t anda rd seems to go along wit h
the “negligence” ra tionale of t he Res ta tem en t  (Se cond) Agen cy
section  219(2)(b)47 and  wi th th e EEOC  Guidelines.48 The  cru x of
th is sta nda rd is wh at  th e employer kn ew an d when .
b. S u per vi sor -crea ted  host i le environm ent sexual
harassment. While  th e Supr eme Cour t declined t o prescribe a
“definit ive rule on em ployer  liab ility”49 for  supe rvi sor -crea t ed
hos t il e environm ent  ha ra ssm ent , the Cour t did dir ect lower
cour t s to “look to agency principle s for  guid an ce in t his  ar ea .”50
Due in p ar t t o th e Su pr em e Cour t’s un willin gne ss t o issue a
defin itive  ru le, th e circu it cour ts  ha ve crea t ed  nonun iform
stan dards.  At  pr es en t , t he s t anda rds  range fr om the k new-or -
should-have-known s t anda rd  used in co-worker  ha rassment
cases (used  in  the  F ir s t , Four th ,  Fi fth ,  Eigh th ,  and Nin th
Circuits) to differen t var iations of section 219 of the a g en cy
res ta tement (used in t he Second, Third, Sixth , Tenth , Eleventh ,
and Dis t r ict  of Colom bia  Cir cuit s). 51 The  Seven th  Circu it’s
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envi ronmen t sexua l ha ra ssm ent  in ea ch circuit .
First  Circuit: employer is liable if he “‘kn ew, or . . . s h oul d h av e k no wn , of t he
ha ras smen t ’s occurre nce, un less t ha t official ca n s how tha t  he  or  she  took appropr ia t e
steps  to ha lt it .’” Morrison v. Ca rlet on Woolen Mills, In c., 108 F.3d 429, 437  (1st Cir .
1997) (qu oti ng  Lip se tt  v. U ni ver sit y of P .R. , 86 4 F .2d  881 , 90 1 (1s t C ir . 19 88)).
Secon d Circuit : employer  is liable if
a ) th e su per visor  wa s a t a  su fficien tly  hig h le vel in  th e com pa ny , or
b) the super visor used his actua l or appa r en t  au thor i ty to  fu r the r  t he
ha ras smen t , or was ot herwise a ided in accomplishing th e har assm ent by
the exis te nce  of th e a gen cy re lat ions hip , or
c) th e em ploye r p rov ide d n o re as ona ble a ven ue  for com pla int , or
d) th e emp loyer kn ew (or sh ould h ave  kn own) o f t he  ha ra ssmen t  bu t
un rea sona bly f ai led  to s top  it .
Torres  v. P isa no,  116 F .3d 625, 63 4 (2d Cir . 1997) (footnote s omit ted ), cert . d eni ed ,
118 S. C t.  563  (199 7).
Th ird Circuit: employer is liable if: 1) the s uper visor was actin g within scope of
employmen t , 2) t he  em ploy er  is n egli gen t (fa ilu re  to a ct u p on  n oti ce), a nd  3) if t he
victim  relied on the appa rent  aut hority of the har asser o r  t he har asser  was aided by
the agency r e la t ion ship . S ee Bouton v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 29 F.3d 103, 106 (3d
Cir . 199 4).
Four th Circuit: employer  is  liable “only if the e mployer  kn ew or sh ould h ave
known  of the il legal con duct  an d failed  to ta ke p rom pt a nd a dequ at e re med ial a ction.”
Andrade  v. M ay fai r M gm t. , In c., 8 8 F .3d  258 , 26 1 (4t h C ir . 19 96).
Fi ft h  Cir cui t: e mp loye r i s li ab le “on ly if i t k ne w or  sh ou ld h av e k no wn  of th e
ha ras smen t  an d failed  to ta ke p rom pt r eme dial a ction.” Na sh v. E lectr ospace S ys.,
Inc.,  9 F .3d  401 , 40 4 (5t h C ir . 19 93).
S ix th Circuit: employer liability is based on “1) whether the su pe rvi so r ’s  ha ra s sing
ac tions were fores eeable  or fell with in t he scope of his e mploym ent  an d 2) even if
they  were , whet her  th e emp loyer responded  adequ at ely an d effectively to ne gat e
liabilit y.” Pi er ce v.  Com mo nw ea lt h L ife I ns . Co. , 40  F. 3d  796 , 80 3 (6t h C ir . 19 94).
Seven th Cir cui t: A m ajor it y of t he  ben ch  believes t ha t “negligen ce is th e only
proper  sta nda rd of emp loyer liabi lity in ca ses of host ile-environ men t sexu al
ha ras smen t  even if as h e r e  t h e h a r as ser  wa s a  su per visor  ra th er  th an  a cow ork er  of
the pla int iff.” Ja ns en  v. P ack agi ng  Cor p. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 494 (7th Cir. 1997)
(en ban c) (per cur iam ), cert. granted in part  Bur l ington Indus .,  Inc.  v.  Eller th , No. 97-
569, 199 8 WL  218 91 (U .S.  J an . 23 , 19 98).
Eigh th  Circuit: employer liability is based on the “knew or should ha ve kn o wn
sta nda rd.” Da vis  v. C it y of Si ou x Ci ty , 11 5 F .3d  136 5, 1 368  (8t h C ir . 19 97).
Nin th Cir cuit : “The proper analysis for  employer liability in hostile environmen t
cases is what  man agemen t-level employees knew or  s h ou l d h ave kn own . . . .” Nichols
v. Fr an k,  42 F .3d  503 , 50 8 (9t h C ir . 19 94).
Ten th Circuit: employer is liable if: 1) the supervisor/harasser acted within scope
of em ploym en t, 2 ) th e em ploye r k ne w or  should have kn own of har assmen t an d failed
to re sp on d, 3 ) th er e was  re lia nce  by v ict im  on  ap pa re nt  au th or it y of ha ra sser , and 4)
the ha ra ss er  ha d d ele ga te d a ut hor it y t o cont rol  vict im’s work  envi ronmen t  and
har asser  use d th at  au th orit y to facilit at e th e ha ra ssm ent . S ee Harr ison v. Eddy
Po tash , In c., 1 12 F .3d  143 7, 1 446  (10t h C ir . 19 97).
E leven th  Cir cuit : em ploye r li ab le if: 1) h e k ne w or  sh ould have kn own and failed
to adequa tely respond, 2) the har assmen t occured with in the scop e of e mploymen t ,
and 3) the har asser  is aided by an agency relat ionship with th e employer. S ee
Far agher  v. City of Boca Raton , 111 F.3d 1 530, 1535 (11th  Cir . 1997), cert . gra nt ed,
118 S. C t.  438  (199 7).
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ P U R - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
909] Y O UN G  v. B A Y ER  C OR P. 919
D.C. C ircu it :  employe r  li abl e pu r suan t  t o “common law pr inciples of agency.” Gary
v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (suggestin g th at  emp loyer will be liab le
if 1) s up er vis or /ha ra ss er  act ed  wit hi n s cope  of em ploy me nt , 2) h ar a ssment  was
intended,  3) employer was negligent  (i.e., knew or  shou ld ha ve kn own), an d 4) victim
relied on ha ra sser ’s app ar ent  au th ority or  ha ra sser  was a ided by t h e  a ge n cy
rela tions hip  (citing to  AGENCY  § 219  (2) (a )-(d))).
52. S ee Youn g v. B ay er  Cor p.,  123  F. 3d  672 , 67 4-75  (7t h C ir . 19 97).
53. The Supreme  Cour t  r e ject ed  a  s t rict l iab ilit y st an da rd  in t his  sit ua tion
(employer lia bil it y for  su pe rv iso r h ost ile  en vir on me nt  se xu al  ha ra ss me nt ). S ee Mer itor
Sav.  Ban k, F SB v. Vins on, 477 U .S. 57, 72 (1986 ). 
54. S ee 29 C .F .R.  § 160 4.1 1(c) (19 97).
[A]n  employer . . . is responsible for its acts an d those of i ts  agen t s  and
superv isory em ployees wit h r esp ect  to s exu al h ar as sm en t r ega rd les s of
wheth er  the specific acts complained of were au thorized or even forbidden
by the em ployer and regar dless of wheth er th e emp lo ye r  k n ew or sh ould
ha ve known of their occurr ence.
Id .
55. S ee supra  note 51.
56. The two except ion s are Young v. Bayer Corp., 12 3 F .3d  672  (7t h C ir . 19 97),
a nd Torres  v . P i sano, 116 F .3d 625 (2d C ir. 199 7), cert . d eni ed,  118  S . C t . 563 (1997)
( sugges t ing th at  an  emp loyer could be lia ble for notice ga ine d  t h r ough someone other
than  a m an ager ial or  high er-m an agem ent  level em ployee). 
57. S ee An dra de v. Ma yfair M gmt ., Inc., 88 F .3d 258, 26 2 (4th  Cir. 1 996)
( sugges t ing th at  som ebo dy “r es pon sib le” m us t b e in for me d of t he  ha ra s smen t ); Nichols
v. F r ank, 42 F.3d 503, 508 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that th e proper test is  w h at
new ly an nou nced n egli-ge n ce  st a n d a r d  pe r h aps fa lls
somew h er e in between  th ese two broad categories.52
Ir re spe ctive of t he  st anda rd appl ied,  however , an  impor t an t , i f
not  th e most  cru cial qu est ion in d ete rm inin g emp loyer lia bility
remains the  quest ion  of wh en  th e em ployer  kn ew of th e
ha ras smen t . In fact, det erm ining when  an  employer ha d not ice
of th e sexua l har ass men t is u nimp orta nt  only under  th e st rict
liabilit y standa rd,53 wh ich  the E EOC pr es en t ly a dvocat es 54 bu t
which no circuit has a dopted.55
3. Cu rrent a pp roa ches for d eterm in in g w hen noti ce to a n
em pl oyee is n oti ce to t he em pl oyer
 Given the im por t ance of th e employer’s kn owledge, cour t s
have neces s a r ily fash ioned ru les to deter mine wh en a n
employee’s knowle dge of h arass men t  can  be  im pu ted  to the
employer. With two exceptions,56 a l l of the  cur ren t  app r oa ches
em-ployed by t h e cir cuit  cour t s ca n  be p la ced  in  one  of tw o
camps. Some circuits say nondescr i pt ly  tha t  “management
level” emp loyees mus t  know of t he  haras smen t  in  order  t o
impu te knowledge to th e employer,57 while t he  othe r  ci r cu i ts
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“m a n a ge m en t-level employees knew”); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, In c., 970 F.2d 178,
185 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding employer liability based on negligence where the em ployer
failed to act given kn owledge of h ar as sm en t b y “ma na gem en t-l eve l” em ploy ee s);
Andrews  v. City of Ph ilade lphia , 895 F.2d 146 9, 1486 (3d Cir. 199 0) (declaring t ha t
pla in ti ff mu st  pr ove “th at  ma na gem en t-le vel e mp loyee s h ad  act ua l or con str uctive
kn owledge ab ou t” t he  ha ra ss me nt ); Hall v.  Gus Const r. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015 (8th
Cir . 1988) (declarin g th at  th e “compa ny will be lia ble i f m a n a gement -level employees
knew”).
58. S ee Reynolds v. CSX Transp., Inc., 115 F .3d 860, 866 (11th Cir. 1997)
(pla in ti ff mus t  show sh e com pla ine d t o “high er  ma na gem en t”); Mor ri son  v. Ca rl et on
Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F .3d.  429,  437 (1 st  Cir . 199 7) (not ice m us t b e t o som eon e
“rep resen t ing the in stitu tion” being sued); Van Zan t v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80
F.3d 708 , 71 5 (2d . Ci r.  199 6) (notice must be t o someone “‘at a  sufficiently high level
in  the [com pan y] hiera rchy’ ” (quot ing Kot cher  v. Rosa & S ulliva n Applia nce Ct r., In c.,
957 F.2d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 1992))); Waltm an v. In tern ationa l Paper  Co., 875 F.2d 468,
478 (5t h C ir . 19 89) (p la in ti ff mu st  sh ow s he  com pla in ed  to “h igh er  ma na gem en t”).
59. 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997) (sug ge s t ing  the approach  adop ted in  Young v.
Ba yer  Corp.), cert . d eni ed , 11 8 S . Ct . 56 3 (19 97).
60. S ee Young v. Bayer Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir. 1997). The
ha ras smen t  included “offensive touchings,” “leers,” “lewd comments a nd solicitat ions.”
Id .
61. S ee id .
62. S ee id .
63. S ee id .
say tha t  “h ighe r -managemen t” must  be on n otice to im pu te
kn owledge  to the  employer .58 Young v. Ba yer Corp. is  im por tan t
because  it  ex-pressly out lines  a n ew a ppr oach, r oughly
suggest ed in T orres v . P isano,59 t o dete rmine  when  an
employee’s kn owledge of sexua l ha r ass men t equ als em ployer
kn owledge.
III. Y O U N G  V . B A Y E R  CO R P.
A . Th e Facts
 Yolanda  Youn g work ed for Ba yer Cor pora tion  in a  chem ica l
manufactu r ing p la n t  wher e her  forem an  sexua lly hara ssed
he r .60 Over the course of thr ee years, Young complained at  least
five times  to her  forem an ’s immed iate su pervisor, who ma na ged
a  depa r tmen t  of six ty em ployees (in clu ding t he p la in t iff ).61 The
depar tment  head never  repor ted  the  ha ras s m en t  to the
pers onnel d irector  pursuan t to company pol icy, but  d id  speak to
the foreman  about  h i s behavior .62 In t he face of cont inued
ha ras smen t , Youn g compla ined  to another  superv isor ,  the
depar tment  hea d’s su bor dinate, w ho re laye d  the compla int s  t o
the per sonne l d ir ector .63 Alt hough  the p er son nel d ir ect or  t ook
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64. S ee id . The a ctions t ake n by t he pe rson nel dir ector a re n ot specified in t he
case. See id . 
65. S ee id .
66. S ee Van Za nt  v. KLM Roya l Dut ch Airlin es, 80 F.3d 708, 71 5 (2d  Cir . 19 96).
67. Young, 123 F.3d at  673.
68. S ee id . at 672.
69. Id . at 673.
70. S ee id . at 672.
71. S ee id . at 673.
72. 123 F.3d  490 (7th  Cir. 19 97) (en ba nc), cert. granted in part  Bur lingt on
Ind us.,  In c. v. E lle rt h,  No.  97-5 69,  199 8 WL  218 91 (U .S.  J an . 23 , 19 98).
73. S ee id . at 495.
74. Young, 123 F.3d at  673.
75. Id .
some act ion ,  the ha rassment  con t i n u ed.64 Su bs equen t ly,  Youn g
filed char ges wit h  the E EOC and t ook s ix m onths u npa id  sick
leave  for  ha rm a ll eged ly  caused  by  the  ha ras smen t .65
Dur ing th e pret rial ph ase t he dist rict court jud ge addr essed
the quest ion of Bayer’s  knowledge a nd  held  th at , followin g th e
Second Circuit’s ra tionale in  Van Zant,66 “not ice  to the
depar tment  head was not  not ice to [Ba yer ]”67 because t he
depar tment  head was  not  in  upper -managem ent  and had  no
du ty to investigate or handle sexua l ha ra s smen t  cha rges.
Accordin gly, th e dis t r ict  cou r t  gran ted summary judgmen t  for
Bayer 68 becau s e i t  foun d th at  once the compan y had  notice of
the ha ras smen t , v ia  t he  pe r son n el director, it res ponded
“promp tly an d resp onsibly.”69 Young  appea led th i s ru l ing  to the
Seven th  Ci rcu i t.70
B. The Cour t’s  Reason ing
On appea l , Young  a rgued tha t  Baye r s hou ld be st rict ly
liable  for  the ha rassm ent of its supervisors.71 Chie f J ud ge
Posner  easily laid th at  ar gumen t  as ide ba sed on  th e circuit ’s
recent  decision in  J ansen v. Packagin g Corporation  of
Am erica ,72 which  he ld  tha t  negligence is t he on ly app licable
s t anda rd in hostile environment sexual har assment  cases.73
Accordin gly, Bayer’s liability depend ed on “whet her  th e
company wa s n egl igen t  in  fa ilin g t o act  pr ompt ly on  [the
pla int iff’s] compla in ts.”74 Th e a nsw er  to tha t  in qu ir y h in ged  on
“whet her  not ice to the pla int iff’s depa rt men t h ead wa s notice to
th e compa ny.”75
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76. S ee supra note s 57-58 an d accompa nyin g text .
77. S ee Young, 123 F.3d at 672-73.
78. 116 F.3d  625 (2d Cir . 1997), cert. den ied, 118 S. Ct . 563 (1997). 
79. Young, 123 F.3d  at  674 (citing Torres, 11 6 F .3d  at  636 -38).
80. S ee id . 
81. Id .
82. S ee id . at  674-75. 
83. Id . at 675.
The cour t began  its a na lysis by noting th e differen t
stan dards  (management  or  h igher -managemen t )76 u sed  in  the
circuit s for  dete rmin ing the  “impor tan t  ques t ion” of the
min imum level in a  compa ny h iera rch y at  which  n ot i ce t o an
employee is notice to the em ployer.77 Un sa t is fied  wit h  eit her  of
these sta nda rds , the court  th en laid out  th e sta nda rd su ggested
by the  Second  Ci rcu i t  in  Torres  v.  Pi sano:78 for em ployee
kn owledge  to be impu ted to th e em ployer , knowle dge of t he
sexua l har ass men t m ust  either
(1 ) come  to  t h e a t t en t ion  of s om e on e  w h o (a ) h a s  u n de r  th e
te rm s of his  e m p l oy m e n t , o r  (b)  is  r easona b ly  be li eved  to  have ,
or  (c) i s r e a son a b ly char ged by law  with  ha ving,  a  du ty to  pas s
on  the  in fo rma t ion  to  someon e  w it h in  t h e  com p a n y  w h o h a s
t h e power  t o d o s om e t h in g ab ou t it ; or (2) com e t o th e a tt en tion
of such  a  som eone .79
The cour t  approved  of th i s approach  for  two reasons . F irst ,
the cour t  noted  tha t  while most compan ies appoint  a designa ted
person to receiv e h a r a ssm ent  cha rges , not a ll do, an d n ot a ll
facilita te  access to the designated p er s on .8 0  But even in a case
where th e compa ny h a s fa ile d t o app oin t  su ch  a  pe r son , or
failed to iden tify or facilit a t e  a ccess t o such a  per son, t his
s t anda rd allows ju dicial in quir y int o “who in  the company the
compla inan t rea son ab ly  bel ieved  was a ut horized to receive and
forward (or  r e spond  to) a  compla int  of ha ra s smen t .”81 Thus,  an
employer  cannot  im munize  it se lf a ga in st  knowin g of
harassment  sim ply by h aving ineffective or poorly publicized
compla int  cha nn els. If an  emp loyer a tt emp ts  th is, th e court  will
then look at who the victim reasonably thought could help.82
Second , the  cour t  p refe r red  the pr act icality of th is approach
to ask ing (and h aving a br ight line r ule th at  decides) at wh at
managemen t  level in the compan y an employee “is the
corpora t ion .”83 Chief Ju dge Posner reasoned,
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84. Id . (cit at ion s om it te d).
85. S ee id .
86. S ee id . Bayer  ar gued “abs ur dly,  in  t h e  t ee th  of  it s  own pol ic ies  as  wel l as
of good sen se,  th at  in a  corp ora tion  th e si ze of Ba yer  th e h ea d of a  dep ar tm en t of
‘only’ 60 workers is too far down the corporate l a dder to count [as employer
kn owledge].” Id .  Posner responded,
Most comp an ies  do n ot h ave  as  ma ny  as  60 wor ke rs . A comp an y doe s n ot
buy effective immunity from the duties th at Title VII places on employers
mer ely by gr owing  to a  poin t a t w hich  it h as  ma ny  lay er s of su per visor y
employees o r  by  s lo t t ing  in  add it iona l l a yers , so tha t  whereas  in  a  company
with  60 employees notice to the president would clearly suffice as notice to
the comp an y, in  a com pa ny  of 20,00 0 em ploye es n ot ice t o a s up er visor  of
300 em ploye es m igh t n ot b e en ough  beca us e t he re  wer e se ver al s up er visor y
laye r s be tween  hi ms elf a nd t he pr esiden t or boa rd of dire ctors. Ver y sma ll
companies are exempted from Title VII. This i s t h e  fi r st  t ime we’ve hea rd
it  ar gu ed t ha t ve ry  lar ge on es a re , too.
Id . (cit at ion s om it te d).
87. F o r example, see  Gar cia v . S an  An ton io M etrop olit an  Tr an sit  Au th ori ty, 469
U.S. 528, 531 (1985) where th e Supreme Court  overruled N ati ona l L eagu e of Cities
Excep t  in s om e closely h eld  corpora t ions ,  no  s ing le  employee  is
t h e c or p o r a t io n  (a n d  a n y w a y  a  c or p o r a t io n  w it h  on ly on e
employee wou ld be  exem pt  from  Tit le  VII  . . . ), so th e
a p p r oa ch  we a re  crit i c iz ing  i s  i n  ques t  o f someth in g  tha t  does
n ot  e x is t , m a k in g  it  “m e t a ph y sica l” in  a  p e jo r a t i ve  s e n s e . W h a t
is  pos sib le t o ide n tify  is w h o h as  t h e  a u t h o r it y t o t e rm i n a te  t h e
h a r a s sm e n t  o f w h i ch  t h e  p l a in t i ff i s c om p l a in i n g  a n d  d id  t h e
pla int iff compla in  t o  someone  who could  reasona bly  be
expec ted to  r e fe r  t he  com pla in t  up  t he  l adde r  to  the  em ployee
a u t h o r i ze d  t o a c t  on  i t .84
In  light  of this s t a n d a rd , the  cour t  ru led  tha t  the
depar tment  hea d’s knowle dge of You ng’s com pla in t s  was
imp ut able  to Baye r .85 This  res u lt  se em ed  pa r t icu la r ly fa ir  to the
cour t  becaus e Bayer’s compan y policy authorized employees to
in form depa r tmen t  heads  of ha ra s smen t , so it  mus t  have
expected tha t  the  depar tment  heads  would t ake  ca re  of the
problem themselves or relay the compla i n ts  to someone  who
could.86
IV. ANALYSIS
In  th e cont ext  of Title VII litiga tion , two a ppr opria te
st an da rd s by wh ich t o ascer ta in  th e value of a r ule ar e whet her
the ru le helps a chieve the r esu lts  for wh ich it  is in te nd ed, a nd
whet her  the ru le can be ap plied  wit hou t u nd ue  difficulty. 87 Pa r t
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v. Usery,  426 U.S. 833 (1976), because, in part,  its test  for finding 10th Amendm ent
in fr ingemen t s was  “unwor ka ble.”
88. Ja nsen  v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 495 (7th  Cir. 19 97), cert .
gra nt ed  in part  Bu rl in gt on I nd us ., In c. v. Ellerth, No. 97-569, 1998 WL 21891 (U.S.
Jan . 23,  199 8).
89. S ee id . (“To fur th er  th e goa ls of t he  Civil  Righ ts  Act . . .  th e im posi tion  of
l iab il it y un de r T it le VI I s ee ks  to d et er  ha ra ss me nt . . . . ”).
90. S ee id .; H.R. R E P . NO . 102-40(I), at  64-70 (1991), reprinted in  1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-08 (com me nt in g on  th e m er it s of t he  199 1 Civ il Ri gh ts  Act
( amend ing th e 19 64 a ct) w h ic h  n ow allows pla int iffs to collect compen sat ory an d
pun itive  dam ages u nder  Title VII s exua l ha r a s sm ent a ctions, the House Report n oted
tha t  “[t]he Com mit tee a lso finds t ha t per mit tin g the recovery of such d am ages w ould
enhance th e effectivenes s of Title VII by m akin g victims of int ent ional dis crimin a t ion
whole  for th eir loss es, by d eterr in g fu tu re act s of d iscri m in ati on  and by e ncourag ing
pr iva t e en force me nt ” (emp ha sis  ad ded )); see also Jan sen , 123 F.3d at 510 (Posner,
C.J ., con cur ri ng  in  pa rt  an d d iss en ti ng  in  pa rt ) (“T h e  pa y m en t  o f damages  in  the
usua l case of sexual hara ssment is an  instru ment for det e r r in g  fu tur e in ciden ts  of
such  hara ssment ra ther th an for restoring lost earnings or fo r fi na ncing exp ens ive
curat ive or  re ha bil it at ive  me as ur es .”); 29 C .F .R.  § 160 4.1 1(f ) (1997) (“Prevention is the
best too l for  th e e lim in at ion  of se xu al  ha ra ss me nt .”).
91. S ee supra  note 90.
A will discuss  how effectively th e Young rule achieves the
pur poses of Title VII, especia lly as compa red t o the two
predomina te alternat ive approaches. Part  B will discuss
potent ial app licat ion difficulties th at  th e Young rule poses.
A. Achieving the Purposes of Title VII
 Congress’ goal in pa ssing Title VII of th e Civil Righ ts  Act
“was to a chieve e qu alit y in em ployme nt  opport un itie s t hr ough
the eradica t ion of discriminatory barriers.”88 Congress chose
employer liability as t he m e a n s t o achieve Title VII’s
era dicat ion ends, r easonin g tha t t he fear  of liability would deter
Title  VII  viola t ion s. 89 Even  though th e am end men ts  to Tit le VII
a l lowing victim  recovery of compensa tory  and pun itive dam ages
can  be r ead to expand t he s t a tu te’s goa ls , t he p r im ary focu s of
Title  VI I r ema ins  the p revent ion of discrim inat ory employer
beh avior  via  the d et er ren t  effect  of em ployer  liab ility. 90
Accordin gly, this ana lysis of Y oung v. Bayer Corp . wi ll focu s on
how effectively its  approach  is in det err ing/prevent ing employer
sex-based discr imin at ion. This  will be followed by a n a na lysis  of
the Young ru le’s a bil it y t o pr omote t he s econ da ry obje ct ive s of
Title VII: victim  relief and pr ivate en forcemen t. 91
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92. Th e EEOC suggests the following deterrent -producing costs should be used:
An  employe r  shou ld take a ll steps necessary to preven t sexual h ara ssment
from  occurrin g, such a s affirm at ively raisin g t he  su bject , exp re ssi ng  st ron g
disap prova l, developin g app ropr iat e sa nction s, in formin g employees  of their
r igh t  to raise an d how to raise th e issue of harassm ent  u n de r  T it l e VII , and
deve loping methods to sensitize all concerned.
29 C.F .R.  § 160 4.1 1(f ) (199 7).
93. S ee Ha rr is v. F or klift Sys., I nc., 510 U.S . 17, 22 (1993) (“A discrimin at orily
abu sive work  envir onm ent , even one that does not seriously affect employees’
ps ych ologica l well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performan ce,
discoura ge emp loyees from r ema inin g on th e job, or keep  th em from  adva ncing in
th eir  car ee rs .”).
94. This  is one of th e rea sons Con gress  pass ed th e am endm ent  allowing p laint iff
r ecove ry for compens at ory an d pun itive da ma ges. It  effectively increases t he
employe r ’s benefit for not being liable and so provide s m or e  incen t ive  to p reven t
sexua l ha ra ssm ent  in t he w orkp lace. S ee H.R. R E P . NO . 102-40(I) at 64-70.
95. S ee Jan sen, 123 F.3d at  511 (Posn er, C.J ., concurr ing in p ar t a nd dis sen tin g
in  pa r t ).
96. S ee id .
97. S ee id .
1. How em pl oyer  liab il it y a cts  as  a d eter ren t
 As an initial matt er, this Note must focus on  h ow emp loyer
liabilit y act s  a s  a  deter ren t t o Title VII violat ions. It ma y be
best expla ined  by a cost /benefit  an alys is. The em ployer’s costs
a re the effor t s a nd e xpen di tu res  necess a ry t o t ry t o p r event
sexua l ha ra ssm ent  by his  emp loyees. The se efforts  could
include: employee tra inin g a nd/or  se min ars,  crea t ion  and
diss em in a t ion  of a sexu a l h arass men t  pol icy, e mploym en t  of
persons to effectuat e th e policy, and  mor e car eful h irin g
pra ctices (to weed  out  potential harassers).92 The cor responding
bene fi t s would be  red uced in st an ces of liability (alon g with  th e
subsequen t l it iga t ion  and  damages  cos t s ) and , a ssuming
redu ced sexual harass m e n t, a h ap pier  an d m ore p rodu ctive
work force.93 As  long  as the  bene -fits out weigh  th e costs , th e
employer will be m otivat ed t o preven t s exua l ha ra ssm en t .94
This  help s expla in wh y st rict  liabi lity is  a les s effective
sta nda rd for  det e r r ing sexua l  ha ra s smen t .95 If employers were
alw ays  liable for t he s exua l ha ra ssm ent  commit ted  by th eir
employees, t he  cos t s  of t rying to el imina te a l l ha rassment
would  probably outweigh  the benefits gained.96 Employer s
would  have l it t l e incen tive t o act pr event ively if the ir
r eas ona ble actions (costs ) could no longer s hield th em from
liabilit y (ben efit s). 97 Inst ead, t hey might  save t he expend itur es
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98. S ee id .
99. S ee Young v. Bayer  Corp., 123 F.3d 672, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1997).
100. S ee supra  note s 57-58 an d accompa nyin g text .
101. S ee supra note 86 . Note how Bayer  was essen t ia ll y t r y in g to  argue
someth ing ak in t o th is. 
102. I r e fe r  t o t he em ploy er a s ma le an d th e victim a s fema le becau se, in t he
sexua l ha ra s smen t  con tex t , t he  ha ra sse r  is  gene ra lly ma le and  the victim is ge ner ally
female.
103. S ee Young, 123 F.3d at 674-75.
ear ma rk ed for  p reven t ion  in  order  t o pa y th e inevit able  liabilit y
costs. Or  worse,  the  employer  could  ju st  keep t he p reve nt ion
money an d pas s th e str ict liability costs on to th e consu mer s.98
In  sum , to the degr ee t ha t Title VII works, it is becau se th e
det e r ren t -inducing benefits outw eigh th e requ ired det err ent -
p roducing costs . We now must  ask , however, if th e Y ou n g r u le
creates similar deterr ents.
2. Em ployer incentives to deter und er Youn g v. B ayer  Cor p.
 The issue in Y oung is  wh en  em ployee  not ice of ha rassment
equ als  employer notice.99 Given th e purpose  of T it l e VI I  and  the
preceding cost/benefit a na lysis, it is easy to see w h y th e Young
cour t  chose not  t o adop t  ei the r  t he “managemen t” or “higher
managemen t” tests used in other circuits.100 Under  e ithe r  of
those st an da rd s, a n a st ut e em ployer  could orga nize the
com p a n y, or de sign at e t he  em ployee t itle s, in  su ch a  wa y th at
very few employees count  as m an agemen t or h igher-
managemen t .101 Th e fewer  the n umber  of em ployees  tha t  can
re ceive knowledge as “th e employer” th e less likely it becomes
tha t  the employer  will h ave  not ice of har as sm en t. I n t his  wa y,
t he emp loyer could la rgely in su lat e him self 102 from knowledge
of an y ha ra ssm en t a nd  would  th er eby es ca pe liability. The
problem is obvious. While the  management /h igher -management
ru le offers  th e ben efit of no lia bil it y, it  doe s n ot  requ ir e cos t s
tha t  effect ive ly d et er  se xu a l h arass men t  behavior .
The Young ru le, on th e other  ha nd, effectively deters  sexua l
ha ras smen t . The Y oung ru le asks  if the  not ice  of ha rassment
came to eit h e r  a per son w ho, pu rs ua nt  to compa ny p olicy,
should  a ct  on th e inform at ion, or t o someone w ho t he vict im
rea sona bly belie ved  wou ld  act  on  the in format ion.103 So, in t he
case of the em ployer tha t t ries t o insulat e hims elf from n otice,
the Young t e st  t hen looks  to whether  an  employee  knew who
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104. Id . at 675.
“could reasonably be expected to refer the complaint up t he
ladder  to t he  em ployer  au th orized  to a ct on it .”104 Wh er e s uch
an  employee knows of the h ar ass men t, th at  knowledge will be
imputed to the employer for liability purposes.
Und er  th e Young test,  then, the employer cannot escape
liabilit y by elimin at ing or r est rict ing a venu es for r eceiving
not ice.  The employer that t ries to do so (by limitin g the n um ber
of “ma na geme nt ” emp loyees or  obfusca tin g lines  of
communica t ion) wil l on ly find t ha t  the ques t ion  of which of his
em ployee s’ kn owle dge ca n  be imp ut ed t o him  is ta ken  out  of his
con t rol and p laced in th e ha nds  of th e “rea sonable” employee,
as deter min ed by t he cour t. Kn owing h e can not  contr ol, in th e
face of a  poor  (nonpreven t ive ) ha rassment  pol icy , the  q u est ion
of who imput es knowledge to the company necessitates tha t an
employer become a war e of sexua l ha ra ssm ent  via any an d all
rea sona ble avenu es of compla int in  order t o respond
ap pr opria te ly an d t he re by esca pe lia bilit y.
In  concret e ter ms, t his m ean s th at  un der t he Young  r u le
employers  have a  st rong in cen t ive  to main ta in  an  unequivoca l
and e ffect ive  sexua l ha ra s smen t  r epor t ing pol icy . In  pa r t icu lar ,
the Young ru le w ill  mot iva te employer s t o make absolu te ly  su re
tha t  ever y em ployee k nows  to wh om t he y sh ould d ire ct se xua l
harassment  compla ints . In th is way, so long as  th e employer-
designa ted  person is a  rea sonable choice, the em ployer
main ta ins re lat ive con t rol  over  which  employees  can  impute
kn owledge t o him  becau se it  would  necessar ily be un reasonable
for  a  ha rassment  v ict im to compla in  t o a nyone els e. Th us , th e
Young ru le encoura ges creat ing un equivocal sexua l har ass men t
repor t ing policies an d a ccessible, well-pu blicized avenues for
compla int .
In  sum, und er  ei the r  t he managemen t  or  h ighe r -
management st an da rd s, t he e mp loyer can  escap e liabilit y
without  enacting any effective harass ment -deterring policies. In
con t r a s t , th e Y oung  t es t  be t ter  rea lizes  the d et er ren t  goa ls  of
Title  VI I because the  employer  i s r equ i red to expend  de ter r en t -
p roducing costs  (clear, a ccessible lines of compla int) in order  to
gain  th e ben efits  (no liab ility) sou ght .
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105. S ee H.R. R E P . NO . 102-40(I), at  64-70 (1991), reprinted in  1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
549, 602-08. 
3. Does  the Youn g approach promote private enforcem ent?
 One of the goa ls  in  am en ding Ti t le VI I t o a llow  for
compensa tory and p u n it ive  damages was to fos t er  p r ivat e
en forcemen t .105 At this early s t age , i t  is  unclea r  whether  the
Young ru le will significan tly increas e privat e enforcement .
There a re  good  a rgumen t s a s  t o whethe r  Young may  or  may  not
help  in th is regar d. On t he one ha nd, becaus e Young poten tia lly
an alyzes the  quest ion  of emp loyer  kn owledge t hr ough  th e
per spe ctive of th e reasona ble employee, the aver age emp loyee
m a y have m ore r eas on t o believe th at  her  complain t of
har as smen t , rea sonably placed, will be acted on, or else t he
em ployer  could face liabilit y. This b elief th at  a compla int  will
be acted on m ay pr ovide more in centive for victim s, a nd
witnesses, to come forward  wi th  compla in t s.  On  the  other hand,
the nu mber  of employees awa re of the Y oun g r u l e and  the
incent ive it pr ovides to pr ivately enforce Title VII is probab ly
not  subst an tial. H ence, the n um bers of employees th e Young
ru le actu ally motivat es to privat ely enforce Title VII is limit ed
to th e relat ively few w h o a re awa re of its existence an d
ram ifications. At t he  very le as t, wh ile the Young  ru le may  or
may not increase private enforcement in pra ct i ce, ther e does
not  ap pea r t o be an y bas is t o ass ert  th at  it will  s om e h ow
decrease privat e en forceme nt  below cur ren t levels . In t his
regard, th e Young  test will at least be no less successful in
encourag ing p r iva te enforcement  than  the  manageme n t  or
higher-man agement tests curren tly used in other circuits.
Not i n g th at  th e Young  rule is theoretically better, and a t
least as good in pra ctice, th an  curr ent  appr oaches does not end
the an alys is. Some th ing als o needs  to be sa id concern ing
possible  consequ ences should t he Young ru le end  up  act ua lly
incr eas ing p r iva te enforcemen t. To the exten t t he Young  ru le
may actua l ly  encourage p r iva te en forcemen t , t he  amoun t  of
sexua l ha ra ssm ent  litiga tion  may also increa se. Increa sed
sexua l harass men t  lit iga t ion  has con se qu en ces  tha t  a re wor t h
men t ion i n g beca use  they n eed t o be  factored  in to any
ass essm ent  of th e Young ru le.
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106. J . Ha rvie Wil k in s on  III, The Prom ise a nd  Prob lem s of S exu al H ara ssm ent
Li tig ati on , 18 H ARV. J.L.  & P U B . P OL’Y 475, 477 (1995) (noting  the pros and  cons tha t
an  in cre as e in  se xu al  ha ra ss me nt  lit iga ti on  wil l br in g).
107. Id .
108. Id .
109. S ee id .
110. S ee id .
111. S ee id .
112. S ee id . at 4 76. Althou gh t he a ut hor is  commen tin g on t he  pr oblem s of
increased  sexual ha rassm ent litig at ion du e to th e broa d definit ion of sexua l
ha ras smen t , the  nega t ive  consequences  ment ioned  wil l a t t end  any  in c r ea se  in  sexua l
ha ras smen t  litiga tion , no m at ter  th e cau se. 
On the p osi t ive  conse qu en ce s ide, increa se d l it iga t ion
“he igh tens  the p rofi le  of an  issu e,” wh ich  may “ma ke m en  more
aware of condu ct t ha t w omen  find offens ive.”106 This increa sed
awareness  could h elp “na rr ow th e gen d er  gap over wher e to
draw th e line b etw een  ha rm less int er act ion a nd  offen sive
ha ra ssm en t.”107 Fear  of a  la wsu it  could  “det er  men  from
engagin g in t he k ind  of condu ct t ha t cr eat es a  host ile work ing
environm ent  for fema le colleagues  an d em ployees.”108
Professionalism an d m ut ua l res pect w ill like ly incre as e in t he
work place.109 More lit igat ion m ight  als o decrea se t he  st igma
ass ociated  wit h h ar as sm en t comp lain ts  an d t he re by en coura ge
victims  to come forward.110 Fin ally, in crea sed  litiga tion  init ially,
may lead t o decrea sed litigat ion overa ll in the fut ur e by
encourag ing compa nie s t o act p re ven tive ly toward  sexua l
ha ras smen t .111
On th e ne gat ive consequ ences  side, in crea sed li tiga t ion
takes a t oll on the court s and th e litigants.112 Fu rt her more,
[s]om e  defe nd an ts  will be  un fair ly sla nd er ed. S om e su its  w ill
be  b rough t  m ere ly  fo r  t he i r  s e t t l em en t  va lue .  The  p r iva t e  l i ves
a n d  per son al a ffair s of m an y citize ns  will be in crea sin gly
opened  to p u blic s cru tin y. T h e  d iscovery process  in  sexu al
h a r a s sm e n t  liti ga tion  will fr equ en tly  en ta il in qu iry  in to t h e
p r i va t e  sex u al  lives  of bot h  t h e  a ccu s ed  h a r a ss er  a n d  t h e
pl a in ti ff h er se lf. Mor eove r, fe ar  of liab ilit y on  th e p ar t of
employe r s  m igh t  le ad  th em  t o censo r  con t rove r s i a l  comm ent s
on  t h e  p a r t o f e m p loyees , th us  re su ltin g in  a n et  re du ction  in
t h e rig h t of fr ee  exp re ss ion . Fe ar  of litig at ion  ar isin g bot h  from
t h e workp lace  and  f rom soc ial in t e rac t ions  cou ld  we l l  deepen
feel ings  of dis tr u st  an d a n xiet y be tw ee n  th e se xes , an d
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113. Id . (foot no te s om it te d).
114. S ee H.R. R E P . NO . 102-40(I), at  64-70 (1991), reprinted in , 1991 U .S.C.C.A.N.
549, 602-08.
115. S ee Young v. Ba yer C orp., 123  F.3d  672, 673 (7t h Cir . 1997). 
116. S ee id . at 675.
117. S ee Fa ra gh er  v. C it y of Boca R at on, 111 F .3d 1530 (11t h Cir . 1997), cert .
discoura ge  w h a t  ar e n oth in g m ore  th an  gen u in e ge st u re s of
f r i endsh ip  be tween  m en  an d  women .113
While  it ma y be too ear ly to tell the t ru e effect th e Young
ru le will h ave , Young s eems to pr ovide incen tives  to pr ivat ely
en force Title VII . Thes e incen tives , however , will be lim ited to
the re lat ive few wh o ar e even  aware of t he  rul e and  it s
ram ifications. To the exten t Young  foster s m ore lit igat ion, it is
impor tan t  to ke ep  the con se qu en ces  of in cr eased sexua l
harassment  lit iga t ion  in m ind ; it m ay be  th at  th e ne gat ive
effects will out weigh th e positive.
4. Does  the Youn g ru le p rom ote v ict im  rel ief ?
 Another  pur pose of Title VII employer liability is to provide
for  vict im  reli ef.114 Because t he Young ru le m akes  it  ea sier  for
an  em ployer  to ha ve n ot ice of h arass m e n t , it  increases the
oppor tun i ties wher e an  employer can be liable. Increa sed
oppor tun it i es for finding notice of harassment  may increase
findin gs of employer liability, dependin g on how the em ployer
responds  to the  not ice , and so more  vict ims than  a t  p resent  will
have op por tun it ies  to obt a in  the n eces sa ry r eli ef.
For  examp le, consider  the d iffe ren t  ou tcomes  tha t  may  have
occurr ed in t he ca ses m ent ioned in  th is  Note  if t he  cour t s would
have applied t he Young rule. First,  consider the case of Yolanda
Youn g her self. Initially she wa s denied r elief because t he
dist rict  cour t  ru led  tha t  the depar tment  head,  who knew of the
ha ras smen t , was  not  h igher -management .115 But  th e Sevent h
Circu it  applied t he Young standa rd and found  tha t  the
depar tment  hea d’s kn owledge was impu ta ble to Bayer. The
case was r ema nded t o determ ine th e adequ acy of Bayer’s
response to the depar tm ent  hea d’s kn owledge.116 Clearly, Ms.
Youn g ha s a bet ter  chan ce of getting relief und er t he Young
stan dard as opposed to a higher-man agement sta ndar d.
Second, con sider  the ca se  of Beth  Ann Faragh er  and N ancy
Ewa nchew.117 Both wer e denied relief because th ey reported th e
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gra nt ed , 118 S . Ct . 438  (1997 ); see also supra notes 1-5,  7-9 and accompany ing  t ex t .
118. S ee Far agh er, 111 F.3d at 1538.
119. S ee id . at 1533.
120. S ee V an  Z ant  v. KL M Roya l Du tch  Airl ine s, 80  F.3 d 70 8 (2d C ir . 199 6); see
also supra  note s 10-15 an d accompa nyin g text .
121. S ee Van  Zan t , 80 F.3d at 715-16.
harassment  t o the ir  supe rvi sor , Gordon , who wa s n ot in  h ighe r -
management . Th e cou r t , t her efor e, d eemed  the n ot ice
inadequa te to im pute  knowledge.118 Had  the cour t  app lied  the
Young t es t , h owever , it  could  have impu ted  knowle dge t o the
city if t he n ot ice g iven  Gor d on  w ou ld  have  sa t i sfi ed  the
rea s on ableness prong of the Young standa rd (i.e.,  that Gordon
wa s a  rea son able  choice for  t he  vi ct ims to lodge th eir comp lain t
with  and expect him to handl e th e pr oblem or r elay it  to
someone else  who could).  Under t he Young standa rd,119 not ice
to Gord on pr obably could ha ve been  imp ut ed t o th e city and  the
cour t  could h ave p rovided  the n eces sa ry r eli ef t o the p la in t iffs.
Fin ally,  Kar en  Van  Zan t 120 could h ave obtain ed needed
relief ha d th e cour t u sed  th e Young s t andard.  Ra ther  than
looking a t  the h eir a rchica l posit ion  of th e superv isor  to whom
Van Zan t  complained,121 a  cour t  app ly ing  Young would  ha ve
consider ed the r ea son able nes s of com pla in in g t o tha t  su pe rvis or
and th e expectat ion tha t t he su pervisor sh ould ensu r e  t h at
proper  persons  became a war e of the  ha rassment . Given  the
r e asonableness of compla in ing  to a  superv isor  and  the lack of
responding rem ed ia l a ct ion  taken by an yone, the em ployer
could well ha ve been  held  liable and Van  Zan t  would have
pr oba bly  bee n  afford ed  reli ef.
In  sum , the Young  ru le b et t er  pr omotes  vict im  reli ef t han
does t h e  m an a ge m en t /h igh er -m a n a ge m en t  t e st . Y ou ng
increas es the oppor tun it ies  wh er ein  em ployee  not ice of s exu a l
harassment  becomes n otice to t h e emp loyer, wh ich in t ur n
increas es th e likelih ood of employer  liabilit y. Increa sed
inst an ces of em ployer  lia bil it y m ea ns m ore vict im s of s exua l
harass men t  wil l be  a fford ed  reli ef.
B. S ome Application Concerns
 Besides th e ability to achieve th e resu lts for which  a  ru le is
intended, an other  mea sur e of th e wort h of a r ule  is t he  re lat ive
ease of its  ap plicat ion. No m at ter  how a ppea ling a  ru le is in
D :\ 1 9 9 8- 2\ F I N A L \ P U R - F I N .W P D Ja n .  8 ,  2001
932 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1998
122. S ee Ga rci a v . Sa n An ton io Me tr o. Tr an sit  Aut h. , 46 9 U .S.  528  (198 5).
123. S ee supra  note s 57-58 an d accompa nyin g text .
124. S ee id .
125. S ee Youn g v. B ay er  Cor p.,  123  F. 3d  672 , 67 4-75  (7t h C ir . 19 97).
t heory , if it pr oves too difficult  to a pply t o rea l cases  it loses  its
usefulness.122 The Y ou n g  r u le r a ises  som e p oten t ia l a pp lica t ion
concern s, especially as compa red t o the m an ageme n t /higher-
man agement ru les used in the other circuits.
1. App ly in g the m an agem ent a nd  h igh er-m an agem ent ru les
 The management  and h igher-ma na geme nt  tes ts  sim ply ask
whet her  someone in  ma na geme nt  or high er-m an agem ent  in t he
company had  not ice  of the  sexua l  ha rassment .123 I f so,  tha t
knowledge  is impu ted t o the em ployer.124 The  ad van ta ge of this
tes t, in  ap plicat ion, is t ha t it  is a  rela tively objective br ight -line
ru le. Eit her  an  em ployee  is  pa r t  of ma nage m en t  or  he  is  not .
Gen er ally,  it  will not be a ha rd  det erm ina tion  to m ak e. The  ru le
is r e la t ively s t raigh t forward and  easy for  any cour t  t o apply to
any sexua l  ha ra s smen t  cl a im.
2. Apply ing  the Young rule
 The Young ru le as k s  wh e t h er  n ot i ce  was  given  to someone
who had  a  duty , or ,  in  th e ab sen ce of anyon e wit h a  du ty, t o
someone who was reasonably believed to have  a  du ty,  to i nform
the em ployer  of the  sexu al  ha ra s smen t .125 Deter minin g wheth er
t he employee who receives initia l notice of har ass men t h as a
du ty to alleviate th e problem or inform  someone who can  will
likely be a n  ea sy  in qu ir y. U su ally , t he cou r t  need n ot  look
beyon d the com pany’s sexual harassm ent policy. If there is no
designa ted  p er son, however , to wh om t he vict im could
compla in,  th e court  mu st  decide wh eth er t he vict im r eas ona bly
believed sh e compla ined  to a n a ppr opria te e mp loyee. Th is
reasonableness tes t is  far  mor e difficult for a  court  to a pply
than  the ma nagement/higher-man agement tests because
reasonableness que st ions a re t ypically more context  dependen t .
W h a t is  rea son able  may dep en d,  among ot her  th in gs , on  t he
ci rcumstances surr ounding the alleged hara ssment a nd the
adequacy of the employer ’s s exu a l h arass men t  pol icy. In
addition , and perha ps most difficult of all,  the court  must
choose  whether to use a r ea son able  man , r ea son able  pe rson , or
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126. The Supreme Court has em ployed the reasonable per son  s tandard  for  sexua l
ha ras smen t  cases . S ee Harr is v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“Conduct
tha t  is not severe or pervasive enough t o create an objectively  h os t il e o r  abus ive work
environment—an en vir onm en t t ha t a  re as ona ble p er son  wou ld fin d h ost ile or
abu sive—is beyon d Ti tle  VII’s pu rv iew. ”). One  comm en ta tor , how ever , sugges t s  tha t
judges do not follow the Supreme Court’s gender-neutra l lead in this area. Inst ead,
judges likely consider the victim’s gender t o some degree. S ee George Ru therg len ,
Sexual  Harassm ent: Ideology or L a w ?, 18 H ARV. J.L.  & P U B . P OL’Y 487, 496-97 (199 5);
see also 29 C.F .R. § 1 609.1(c) (1997) (stating th at th e reasonable person stan dard
includes con sid er at ion  of th e a lle ged  vict im ’s gen de r).
The choice betwee n u sin g  t h e  r ea sonable man  o r  pe r son  s t anda rd  or  u s ing  the
reasona ble woman  stan dard could be critical to the outcome of the case. Given th e
dra ma tic differences in th e reactions of men and women  to potentia lly ha ra s s ing
behav io r , see Rut her glen, supra  at 497,  i t  seems  plau sible th at  who a m an  th inks  it
would  be reasonable to complain to after being hara ssed mi gh t  a l so be  di fferen t  than
who a female victim think s it would be reasonable to complain to. For example, after
bein g ha ra ssed by a  ma n, a  female  ma y rea sona bly not wis h t o the n compla in t o
anoth er  male, wher eas a m ale victim would not care. So under th e Young rule,
wheth er  o r  not  t he person com pla ine d t o wa s a  re as ona ble ch oice cou ld d epe nd  on
wheth er  reasona bleness is judged from a male or female pers pective.
127. S ee generally Robert  S. Adler a nd E llen R. P eirce, T h e Lega l , E th i ca l , and
Social Im pli cat ion s of t he “Rea son abl e Wom an ” S ta nd ard  in  S exu al H ara ssm ent  Cas es,
61 F ORD HAM  L. RE V. 773 (1993) (noting  th e de velop me nt  of th e r ea son ab le wom an
s tanda rd as an  altern ative to the r easonable m an and rea sonable person standar ds.
While  th e au th ors focus on t he concer ns r aised  by implem ent at ion of a rea sona ble
woman  stan dard, problems a nd concerns sur rounding t he rea sonable man  and
rea sona ble per son s ta nda rds  ar e ne cessa rily dis cuss ed.). 
128. S ee Young, 123 F.3d at 674-75.
129. S ee J O H N W. WA D E  ET AL ., P R O S SE R , WADE , AND SCHWARTZ’S  CA S E S  AN D
MATERIALS O N  TORTS , 143-69 (9t h e d. 1 994 ) (givi ng  ma ny  exa mp les  of how the
reasonableness st an da rd  is u se d in  tor t l aw ).
rea sona ble woma n  stan dard, 126 each  one pr esen tin g difficult
i ssues  for  a  cour t  to wade th rough .127
The compara t ive incr ea se in  difficulty of ap plyin g th e
reasonableness prong of the Y oung ru le as  opposed to the
management or  h igher -management  ru les , is  offset, however,
by the  fact  tha t  it n orm ally only comes  in t o play in  the a bs en ce
of an  ad equ at e compa ny compla i n t procedure, 128 cou r t s  a r e
already accus tom ed t o dealin g with  a  r e asonab leness  st anda rd
in  their court rooms,129 an d  t h e Young ru le’s su per iorit y in
achieving Title VII objectives.
V. CO N C L U S I O N
Em ployer liability is the p r imary mean s used by Title VII to
ach ieve its non-discrimination purpose. What th e employer
kn ew an d when  he kn ew it is often th e ke y fa ctor, in every
circuit , for  de ter min in g em ployer  lia bil it y. S o the ques t ion  of
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130. Sin ce th e writ ing of this  Note, t he Su prem e Cour t gr an ted cer tior i  t o
Fara gh er v. Ci ty of  Boca  Ra ton , 111 F .3d 1530 (11t h Cir . 1997), cert. granted,  118 S.
C t . 438 (1997). This case p r ov id e s t he Court an  opportunity to implemen t th e Young
s t anda rd na ti on wid e. O ne  of fo u r  of th e qu es ti ons  pr es en te d a sk s: “II . Ma y a  fact -
finder infer notice to an employer of hostile-environment sexual harassm ent : . . . C.
Thr ough  ac tua l  not i ce  t o a n  in te rm edi at e s up er vis or,  wh o re por ts  it  no fu rt he r?”
Quest ions P resen ted, Oct ober  Ter m 1 997,  p. 23 , av ail ab le fr om t he  Su pr em e Cou rt
of the  Uni ted  S ta tes ,  Washin gton, D.C. Wh eth er or  not t he Su prem e Cour t will
actu ally ru le on t his is sue  is un kn own. On e can  only wa it a nd s ee. 
131. Sin ce the You ng decision, it has  been cited twice outside the Se ve n th
Circu it . But neither case cites Young for wha t it  is wort h. Both  cases in stea d cite it ,
one  perh aps  incorr ectly, in su pport  of propositions  th at  ar e fairly sta nda rd in  eve ry
circuit.  S ee Bonenberger  v . P lymouth  Township , No. 97-1047, 199 7 WL 7728 42, at  n.7
(3d Cir. Dec. 17, 1997) (citing Young for the pr opos it i on  t hat wh en two employees
cha rged with  th e dut y to inves tigat e sexu al h ar ass men t claim s fail to do so, e mployer
liabil it y will exist); Deters  v. Equifax Credit In fo. Serv., Inc., No. 96-2212-JWL, 1997
WL 688744, at  *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 3, 19 97) (citing Young in  se conda ry suppor t  of  the
cour t ’s conclu sion  th at  som eon e wa s a  “ma na ger ial  age nt ” of the  em ployer because
he ha d a ut ho ri ty  over  hi ri ng  an d fir in g).
when  not i ce  to an em ployee of sexual ha ra ssm ent  const itut es
not ice to the employer is crucial. Despi t e t h e nationwide
impor tance of the issue it  has r eceived  lit t le a t t en t ion  from
comment ators. Th is  Not e brough t  it s impor tance t o the
forefr ont  wh ile dis cuss ing t h e  cu r ren t  approaches to the
ques t ion .
The approach  t aken  in  Youn g v. Bayer Corp ., wher ein t he
cour t  as ks  if th e kn owledge  of ha rassment  has  come to the
kn owledge  of one who has , or is reasona bly believe d t o h ave,  or
is cha rged  by law w ith  ha ving a duty t o inform t he e mp loyer is
a  we ll-r ea son ed app roach t o the pr oblem. The Young approach
is not  only more r ealistic th an  th e does-mana gement /higher-
management -know approach used in other circuits, it  also
encoura ges the employer to expend costs th a t  effectively deter
harassment  in ord er t o gain t he b ene fit of no liability. The
Young appr oach also better  promotes p rivat e enforcement  of
Title VII and bet ter  facilitat es victim  relief tha n does eith er t he
ma na gement  or  h igher -management  t es t s . Al though  the Young
ru le will be h ar der  to a pply t ha n t he m ore objective
management /h igher -management st an da rd , it s hou ld n ot pr ove
imp ra ctical.  Besides, th e increas ed applicat ion difficulty is
more th an  offset  by Young’s ability to bett er a chieve Tit le VII
objectives.
For  th ese rea sons, it is imper at ive tha t eith er t he Supreme
Cou r t 130 or every circuit 131 indepen dent ly adopt th e Young  ru le
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for  de ter min in g wh en  not ice t o an  em ployee  of sexua l
harassment  is  not ice to the employer .  Until  t ha t  happens , the
goals of Title VII will  r emain  unaccompli shed th roughout  much
of the  coun t ry.
S tanford E dw ard Pu rser
